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POLITICS AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT ELECTED
LEGISLATORS SHOULD MAKE THE LAWS*
DAVID SCHOENBROD
[T]he most significant development in the law over the past
thousand years .... is the principle that laws should be made not
by a ruler, or his ministerf, or his appointed judges, but by
representatives of the people.
-Justice Antonin Scalia
[T]he cabdriver asked me what's the hearing about. "[Its title is]
'does Congress delegate too much power to agencies and what
should be done about it. "' He said '2" "why do they want to hear
about that? They know the answer.
• Copyright 2002, David Schoenbrod.
•* Professor, New York Law School, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute. I am particularly
indebted to Marci Hamilton, my partner in the delegation wars, with whom I discussed this
article from its earliest stage. I am also indebted to Jonathan H. Adler, Robert Gasaway,
Gary Lawson, David I. Levine, Ross Sandier, and Harry Wellington for insightful
comments on drafts as well as William Mills, my law library liaison at New York Law
School, for his sleuthing, and Samantha Burd, New York Law School class of 2003, for
excellent research assistance.
1. Antonin Scalia, Editorial, How Democracy Swept the World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
1999, at A24.
2. Does Congress Delegate Too Much Power To Agencies and What Should Be Done
About It?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 102
(2000) (statement of David Schoenbrod). By way of disclosure, a book in which I
criticized delegation (DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)) had a role in triggering
some recent developments on the delegation front, or at least the press seems to think so.
See e.g., John J. Fialka, Professor Seeks to Limit Congress [sic] Ability to Delegate Tasks
to Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1999, at B 12; Tony Mauro, Putting the
Regulatory State to a Major Test, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at 13. Professor Marci
Hamilton and I submitted pro se amicus briefs in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996), and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Our briefs seemed to have
some impact. Compare Brief Amicus Curiae of Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod
in Support of Petitioner at 4, Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (No. 94-1966)
with Loving, 517 U.S. at 757. Compare Brief Amicus Curiae of Marci Hamilton and David
Schoenbrod in Support of Appellees, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
(No. 97-1374) with Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Also, the statutory precedent upon
which the EPA critically relied in promulgating and defending the regulation at issue in
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), was based upon an interpretation
of the Clean Air Act that I, while long previously representing the Natural Resources
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After the revolutionaries fought under the banner of "No Taxation
Without Representation," the Framers adopted a Constitution that
barred any new tax unless a majority of the representatives in a
directly elected legislature personally took responsibility for it. 3 This
Constitution required legislators to take responsibility not only for tax
laws, but all other laws regulating the people, as well as all laws
appropriating their money. While Justices who had lived through
Defense Council, had successfully pressed on the agency and the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g.,
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d. 320 (2d Cir. 1976); Lead Industries
Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d. 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1981).
Professor Hamilton and I submitted an amicus brief in Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns,
which became Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, this time on behalf of several
manufacturing trade associations. Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc., The
Aluminum Ass'n, and the Steel Manufacturers Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257).
Finally, I helped to draft legislation discussed in this article to vindicate the principle that
the elected legislators should make the law. Congressional Responsibility Act of 1999, S.
1348, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2301, 106th Cong. (1999).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8. The individual responsibility comes from the
requirement that Congress publish the votes of individual members at the demand of
twenty percent of the legislators. Thus, a roll call vote is required for any controversial
legislation.
4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States ... "); U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes ... "); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.").
No. 1] The Principle That Legislators Should Make Laws 241
these events were still on the Supreme Court, the Court in its first
delegation case reasoned from the premise, shared by both parties,
that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to delegate these
legislative powers. 5 The early Congresses did not make a practice of
delegating them.
6
The principle that elected legislators should make the laws became
a fundamental part of American folklore, where it remains to this day.
Imagine the outrage if Congress dared enact a statute that made it a
felony for an individual to commit an act that endangers public health,
safety, or welfare, such acts to be listed in advance in regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General. People would rightly condemn
the statute on the ground that laws should come from elected
lawmakers.
The Supreme Court would strike this hypothetical statute under its
void for vagueness doctrine. That doctrine is designed not only to
require notice of what the law prohibits, which this hypothetical
statute does provide, but also to vindicate the principle that elected
legislators should take responsibility for the law, which this statute
would violate. 9
The public would also be outraged if Congress delegated to the
Internal Revenue Service the power to set income tax rates or
delegated to the president carte blanche power to appropriate money.
Yet, the reaction would be far different if Congress enacted a statute
that makes it a felony for a person to emit pollution that endangers
public health, safety or welfare, such emissions to be listed in advance
in regulations promulgated by the administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Many of those who decry the delegations of
5. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
6. There have been assertions to the contrary, but they are based upon a
misunderstanding of the concept of legislative power. See infra text accompanying note
18.
7. Although far less sweeping powers were granted to the Attorney General by the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001), civil libertarians condemned it for letting the Attorney General dictate the law.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002,
at 44 (criticizing USA PATRIOT Act for setting out a "breathtakingly vague and broad
definition of terrorism and of aiding terrorists" and giving too much discretion to the
Attorney General). See also Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism,
29 CONN. L. REv. 1627 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577 (1974); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). The hypothetical statute also raises federalism
issues, but they are not the focus of this article.
9. See Smith, 415 U.S. at 572, 575.
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legislative power hypothesized in the previous paragraphs would be
untroubled by delegating to the EPA administrator. The New York
Times editorial board opined that the Line Item Veto Act was
unconstitutional because it delegated (in a limited way) the legislative
power to appropriate funds, yet ridiculed the idea that that the Clean
Air Act was unconstitutional because it delegated the legislative
power to regulate private conduct.'0 Moreover, the Supreme Court
would surely uphold the delegation to the EPA adminsitrator. In fact,
it recently upheld such a delegation in its unanimous decision in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n., I I
The author of the opinion was Justice Antonin Scalia, who also
wrote that "the most significant development in the law over the past
thousand years .... is the principle that laws should be made not by a
ruler, or his ministers, or his appointed judges, but by representatives
of the people."' 12 His opinion in American Trucking begins its
discussion of delegation boldly: "Article I, § 1, of the Constitution
vests '[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the
United States.' This text permits no delegation of those
powers .... ,1 It ends limply: "we have 'almost never felt qualified
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the 
law."'
American Trucking is widely understood as repudiating the
constitutional doctrine forbidding the delegation of legislative power
or refusing to enforce it on the basis that the Court lacks a judicially
manageable standard.15
10. Editorial, The Court Vetoes Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A22 ("It is
unfortunate that the majority opinion rests solely on the procedural problem, never
reaching the more profound constitutional defect. The line item veto is an affront to the
separation of powers and an abrogation of responsibility by Congress."); Editorial, Bad
Decision on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A22 (criticizing the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for striking EPA regulations on the basis of the delegation
doctrine).
11. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
12. Scalia, supra note 1, at A24.
13. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.
14. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
15. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Rediscovering a Principled Commerce Power, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 547, 585-86 (2001) ("The unanimous reversal of the D.C. Circuit [in
American Trucking] strongly hints that the Court is without a workable standard .... ");
Sandra B. Zellmer, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Fledgling Phoenix or Ill-Fated
Albatross?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11151, 11159 (2001) ("[O]ne wonders whether there is
anything of substance left [to the nondelegation doctrine]."); Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 306, 528 (2001) (reading American Trucking as discussing and debating the lack of a
judicially manageable standard, but arguing "the Court's steadfast adherence to an empty
[Vol. 26
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This article takes a radically different view of American Trucking
and the delegation case law in general. In it, I contend that at least
some Justices believe that the Constitution does embrace the principle
that elected legislators should make the law, and further believe it is
judicially manageable. They shy away from enforcing it because it is
politically unmanageable to stop Congress from delegating politically
controversial choices to expert administrative agencies. The Justices
find an outlet for their convictions by stopping delegations to
governmental institutions and officers other than administrative
agencies acting under the cloak of expertise. This article argues that
the Court has on occasion stopped delegations of the legislative power
that the Constitution vests in the Article I legislative process to states,
law enforcement officers and juries, an agency lacking the cloak of
expertise, Congress acting outside the Article I legislative process,
and the president acting outside the Article I legislative process. This
insight not only provides a way to understand seemingly disparate
areas of case law, but also suggests that the Court does have a useful,
although not all-powerful, role in enforcing the constitutional
principle that elected legislators should make the law. That role could
eventually have repercussions for delegations to agencies acting under
the cloak of expertise.
Part I briefly explains how the Framers' robust idea of legislative
responsibility deteriorated to the limp thing that is American
Trucking. Part II surveys and rejects the various theories used to
rationalize the Court's failure to stop delegation of lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies: (a) the Constitution was
implicitly amended to allow delegation; (b) delegation does not
undercut the purposes of Article I; and (c) delegation is nonjusticiable
because there is no judicially manageable test, it is a necessity of
modern government, and the Court has so recognized this by never
enforcing it except in two aberrant cases. Part 1I contends that, for at
least some Justices, the real reason for not opposing delegation of
lawmaking authority to administrative agencies is political: striking
delegation all of a sudden would bring a withering backlash,
especially from the legislators who would have to shoulder
responsibility. Part IV shows that, despite this political difficulty, the
Court has been taking baby steps to advance the delegation principle.
Part V explains why the Court took no such baby step in American
Trucking. Part VI identifies the importance of understanding the
doctrine is curious, and probably misguided.").
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politics of the delegation case law.
This article does not argue that delegation is bad public policy nor
does it argue in plenary fashion that the Constitution properly
interpreted forbids it. I have made such arguments at length in a
book.' 6 This article is rather an effort to come to terms with what I
have since learned about the political obstacles to enforcing the
delegation doctrine.
I. HISTORY
The notion that constitutional principle required that elected
lawmakers make the law remained intact until the Progressive Era
that bridged the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
Progressives believed that the scientific method could be used to
solve many public policy problems. In keeping with that belief,
Congress began to enact statutes that instructed experts in federal
agencies to deploy science to accomplish popular goals.' 7 These
statutes effectively left specifying the rules of private conduct up to
the agencies.
Yet, the Progressives did not see their statutes as delegating
legislative power. They thought of the scientific method as producing
sure results in the public interest.' 8 By this logic, Congress had
enacted the laws because the scientific method put certainty into
statutory language that was otherwise open-ended.
We now believe that the Progressives put too much faith in the
scientific method and expertise. Scientists often do not come up with
sure results, even in the seemingly hard sciences.' 9 Even sure results
cannot be translated into regulations without the regulator making
policy and political judgments along the way. The agencies
themselves, although styled as expert, are highly political. As former
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich once put it, agency politics
16. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 2.
17. See, e.g., Tea Importation Act, ch. 358, 29 Stat. 604 (1897) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 41-50 (1994)) (repealed 1996) (statute at issue in Butterfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470 (1904)); Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1891) (statute
at issue in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)).
18. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 32.
19. See, e.g., Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, in
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS 9
(1986) ("[S]cience was being asked a question that lay beyond its power to answer; the
question was trans-scientific. Yet the regulator, by law, was expected to regulate, even
though science could hardly help in the process. This is the regulator's dilemma.").
[Vol. 26
No. 1] The Principle That Legislators Should Make Laws 245
"confounds the ideal of scientific policy-making on which the
legitimacy of regulatory agencies is based." Lawmaking by expert
agencies is politics by other means.
Not knowing what we now know, the Supreme Court of the
Progressive Era upheld the statutes on the theory that the expert
agencies were applyinjl statutory law to facts as they found them
rather than making law.
Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Progressives had
jettisoned the principle that elected legislators must take responsibility
for the laws. The Progressives sprang from a tradition that embraced
separation of powers. When it came to delegating legislative powers
to plainly non-expert bodies, the Progressives were not blinded by
their misplaced faith that science provided sure answers. The
Supreme Court of the Progressive Era struck statutes in which
Congress delegated its legislative power to juries or state
legislatures. Yet, although knowledgeable people today do not have
the same blind spot as did the Progressives, our judicial and political
culture inherited their tolerance for delegations of questions
seemingly susceptible to scientific answer to bodies seemingly
committed to the scientific method. That tolerance would not extend
to my hypothetical statute granting sweeping lawmaking powers to
the Attorney General over matters that have no pretense of
technicality.
In 1935, the SuRreme Court handed down two decisions, Panama
Ref Co. v. Ryan and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,25 striking the New Deal's National Industrial Recovery Act.
The Act gave the President sweeping power to regulate the economy
with only the slightest of guidance from Congress. Because the statute
created an administrative agency and decisions before and since have
generally upheld delegations involving such agencies, these two
decisions are often thought of as constitutional oddities. For example,
Cass Sunstein wrote that 1935 was "the nondelegation doctrine's only
20. Robert B. Reich, The Politics of Regulation, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1980, at
36, 37 (reviewing THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980)).
21. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 31-34.
22. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 25, 86, 89, 448-49 (1893).
23. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
24. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
25. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
good year.",2 6 Yet, the Act was different from those upheld before
because it did not fit the Progressives' idea of scientific policy
making. It was clear that the pivotal role in drafting the regulations
that the President would sign into law would be played by committees
made up of representatives of regulated businesses and unions. These
regulations were thus clearly political rather than scientific in origin.
Perhaps, too, the Court was beginning to see through the idea of
scientific policymaking and to realize its implications for democratic
accountability.
Although one decision was unanimous and the other nearly so, the
Court could not permanently reverse its failure to enforce the
principle that elected legislators should make the laws. Having
muddied the concept in the context of supposedly scientific policy
making, the Court no longer had a principled basis for strikinfi
statutes for delegating legislative power to administrative agencies.
Its decisions of 1935 could thus be portrayed as result -oriented and
so made the Court vulnerable to political pressure. That pressure
came with a vengeance in President Franklin Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan, coupled as it was with the argument that delegation was
needed to deal with the exigency of the Great Depression. The Court
wilted under the pressure and its capitulation was solidified by
President Roosevelt's new appointments to the Court and yet another
exigency, World War II. 28 By the mid-1950s, Congress was free to
delegate with so little constraint that a leading scholar pronounced the
death of the doctrine against delegation. 29 Today, executive branch
appointees routinely write laws and sometimes even imposes taxes
with the thinnest of congressional guidance. 30 Hidden in the 1996
Telecommunications Act is a provision that does not employ the word
"tax" but which authorizes the Federal Communications Commission
to levy a tax at a rate of its own choosing on everyone's long distance
telephone bill.3'
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303,
332 (1999).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
28. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 40.
29. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 75-76 (1958).
30. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (upholding
statute that grants the Secretary of Transportation power to impose user fees based on
usage of hazardous pipelines).
31. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2002):
Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the
[Vol. 26
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The modem Supreme Court has not, however, been entirely content
with the evident departures from the principle that elected legislators
should make the laws. Justices as diverse as William 0. Douglas32
and William Rehnquist 33 have expressed concern. The Court hasS34
narrowly construed statutes in the name of curbing delegation. It has
also found ways to strike statutes that delegate in various unusual
35
ways. Even so, it has framed the opinions in terms that make no
promises to do anything about the general phenomenon of delegation
36
to expert federal agencies.
Then, a little something happened in 1996. The Court's opinion in
Loving v. United States talked about the delegation doctrine in the• . 37.
present tense and not as a relic of the distant past. Although turning
aside the delegation challenge to a statute that authorized the
President to establish the criteria for death sentences in military
tribunals, the Court noted that
Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications,
bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch
most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. Ill suited
to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful
execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the
Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct
electoral control. The clear assignment of power to a branch,
furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to
answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary
decisions essential to governance .... [T]he delegation doctrine,
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission
to preserve and advance universal service. The Commission may exempt a
carrier or class of carriers from this requirement if the carrier's
telecommunications activities are limited to such an extent that the level of such
carrier's contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service
would be de minimis. Any other provider of interstate telecommunications may
be required to contribute to the preservation and advancement of universal
service if the public interest so requires.
Id. See also David Schoenbrod & Marci Hamilton, Congress Passes the Buck - Your Tax
Buck, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1998, at A10.
32. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974).
33. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This case is commonly referred to as the Benzene case.
34. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 641; Nat'l Cable Television, 415 U.S. at
342; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Delegation
Canons, 67 U. Cmi. L. REV. 315 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983). See also cases cited supra note 8 (void for vagueness cases).
36. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,440 (1998); Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 945.
37. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996).
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38
has developed to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.
In framing the question of delegation this way, the Court was
recalling that the Constitution's lawmaking process was designed to
ensure democratic accountability. The Court was also recalling that
the Constitution's lawmaking process was designed to promote liberty
by checking the House of Representatives with a separately selected
Senate and President. 39 Delegation allows laws to be made in ways
that circumvent these checks.
Loving was followed in 1998 by Clinton v. City of New York, which
struck the Line Item Veto Act. The Court conceived of the particular
form that the line item veto took in that statute as an exercise of
legislative power and struck the statute because it provided that this
legislative power was to be exercised by the President alone and not
the full Article I legislative process. The problem with the statute, the
Court asserted, was that it allowed deviation from the legislative
process mandated in Article I rather than that it delegated legislative
power to the president (a spurious distinction, as I will argue later).
Thus, the Court said its striking the Line Item Veto Act was
independent of its permissive attitude towards delegating to
41
administrative agencies. Yet, along the way, the Court narrowly
construed the 1892 decision in Field v. Clark, to which the modem,
permissive approach to delegation can be traced. 43 In that case, the
Court upheld a statute that authorized the president to raise tariffs on
goods from countries whose tariffs were "reciprocally unequal,"
reasoning that the president had only to find 
a fact. 4
After Clinton v. City of New York came AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, decided in early 1999. 45 It narrowly construed a
power delegated to the Federal Communications Commission. The
motive, according to a thoughtful law review article by a recent law
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
195-96 (1972).
40. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). See also Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Michael B. Rappaport, The
Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the
Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 265 (2001).
41. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
42. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
43. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 442-44.
44. Id. at 442-43 (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 693).
45. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
[Vol. 26
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46
clerk to Justice Stephen Breyer, was to avoid delegation problems.
Running in tandem with these delegation-related decisions were a
series of federalism decisions in which the Court gave voice to the
previously dormant notion that the Court has a role to play in keeping
47
Congress within its powers enumerated in the Constitution. The two
lines of cases raised the question whether the Court might be willing
to place some modest curbs on Congress, not only in stretching its
enumerated powers, but also in delegating them to federal agencies.
The Court soon had an opportunity to answer that question. A few
months after Clinton v. City of New York, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
expressly invoked the delegation doctrine to invalidate two
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations establishing
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.48 The stakes in
these regulations included, according to the EPA, the lives of
thousands, the health of millions, and the outlay of tens of billions of
dollars per year.49 The D.C. panel held that the statute as interpreted
by the EPA was so open ended as to violate the delegation doctrine.
Yet, in a new twist on that doctrine, the appellate court held that the
agency could save the statute by interpreting it to reduce the50 . . 51
vagueness. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The result was
its opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, seeming
to foreswear any intention to block delegation to administrative
52
agencies.
46. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401-02 (2000).
47. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh'g granted in
part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
49. Brief for the Petitioners at 1, 8-15, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (No. 99-1257); Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 8-11, Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426). Industry claimed that the costs would be
much higher. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 8-11, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426).
50. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
51. Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
52. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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II. RATIONALIZATIONS
A. The Constitution Was Amended to Allow Delegation
One way to read the modem delegation cases is that the delegation
doctrine is now only a ghost. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring
opinion in American Trucking in which he argued that the Court's
modem delegation cases allow Congress to delegate its legislative
53 54
power. If he believes that the delegation doctrine is dead, he does
not explain when it died or how.
Bruce Ackerman, however, had previously offered an
explanation. 55 He argues that there was a "constitutional moment" in
56
1936 when the people amended the Constitution to allow delegation.
As the argument goes, the Supreme Court's decisions of 1935 against
delegation initiated the constitutional moment by asking the people
whether they wanted to amend the Constitution to allow delegation.57
They answered "yes" by reelecting a President and a Congress known
58
to favor delegation.
Even if Ackerman is correct in his fascinating and dangerous
assertion that the Constitution can be amended in ways other than
through the arduous procedures specified in Article V, there was no
constitutional moment for delegation. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, far from bringing the constitutionality of delegation to the
people, sought to suppress the issue. He squelched a movement within
his own administration to press for an amendment authorizing
delegation out of fear that the issue would cost him and his party59
votes. Ackerman's supposed constitutional moment was a moment
53. 531 U.S. at 489 ("In Article I, the Framers vested 'All legislative Powers' in the
Congress, Art I, § 1, just as in Article II they vested the 'executive Power' in the President,
Art II § 1. Those provisions do not purport to limit the authority of either recipient of
power to delegate authority to others") (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring), INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
54. Some of Justice Stevens' other opinions suggest he sees some vitality in the
delegation doctrine. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 774-75 (1996) (Stevens, J.
concurring in the judgment); Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
646 (1980) (plurality opinion).
55. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013 (1984).
56. Id. at 1053-55.
57. Id. at 1053-55.
58. Id. at 1054-55.
59. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"
Plan, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 347, 385-86 (1966).
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of silence.
Far from recognizing an amendment authorizing delegation, the
60 61
Court continues to state, as in Loving and American Trucking, that
the Constitution forbids delegation of legislative power. It still
interprets statutes in the name of avoiding constitutional concerns
about delegation. 62 It still, as we shall see, bars delegations that do not
63fit the Progressive model.
B. Delegation Does Not Undercut The Purposes Of Article I
Another rationalization for readily permitting delegation is that the
Supreme Court, taking a functionalist approach, has found that
delegation to federal administrative agencies offends no purpose of
the Constitution. There have been several variations on this theme.
In decisions in cases filed before the New Deal, the Court stated that
some delegation is permissible if Congress has taken responsibility
for agency lawmaking by controlling it with an "intelligible principle"
65
in the statute. The theory that the "intelligible principle" test still
required Congress to take responsibility wilted, however, in the face
of the Court's construing an "intelligible principle" to include
concepts such as "the public interest." 
66
The Court next offered the rationale that Congress was still
responsible for the laws made by agencies because it can always
repeal them.67 This rationale too was abandoned in the face of the
60. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758.
61. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.
62. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 109 (1990).
63. See infra note 69.
64. See Felix Franfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1013 n.ll (1924).
65. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); see also
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669 (1975).
66. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) ("The
touchstone provided by Congress was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity,' a
criterion which 'is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit."') (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940)); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932) ("[T]he term
Ipublic interest' as thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct
relation to adequacy of transportation service .... ).
67. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); see also Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 753-54 (D.D.C. 1971); Louis L. Jaffe, An
Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 11, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 565 (1947).
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obvious fact that the Court has repeatedly held that Congress does not
act by remaining silent.68 That makes sense because it is all but
impossible for voters to hold their representatives accountable for
their votes in roll calls that never took place.
I have argued that delegation undercuts democratic accountability
and Dan Kahan, Jerry Mashaw, and Peter Schuck have taken issue
69 70
with me.69 Because I have already responded at length, I will not
replicate the debate. The gist of it is that they emphasize that agency
heads are not free to promulgate laws by whim but rather are
constrained by a variety of forces, many of them democratic in origin.
Their argument for delegation stands the Progressives' argument on
its head. The Progressives favored delegation because the agencies
would be insulated from popular politics. Kahan, Mashaw, and
Schuck, on the other hand, favor delegation because the agencies
would be responsive to popular politics. They exaggerate, in my
opinion, the extent to which agencies must be responsive, but the pith
of our disagreement is this. For them, the glass is half full in that the
agency lawmakers must be somewhat responsive to popular concerns.
For me, the glass is half empty because the lawmakers in Congress do
not have to take responsibility for the laws. Making the
representatives take the blame is the reason behind the principle
embodied in Article I that elected legislators should make the law. It
is a full glass to which we are constitutionally entitled.
Whatever the merits of the debates among scholars, the Supreme
Court has long since stopped contending that delegation does no harm
to democratic accountability. It invokes the accountability-enhancing,
liberty-protecting purposes of the Article I legislative process in
striking delegations to entities that are more politically accountable
than agencies and in narrowly construing delegations to agencies.71
68. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,440 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of congressional
intent .... ); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n.23 (1983) ("To allow Congress to evade
the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere
silence cannot be squared with Art. I."); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969)
("Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.").
69. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 131-57 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Shmemocracy, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments
on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1999).
70. David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999).
71. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998); Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 945; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
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Loving, in the language quoted above, explicitly acknowledges that
delegation undermines democratic accountability and the structural
safeguards of liberty.
Justice Scalia, the author of the Court's opinion in American
Trucking, plainly believes that the delegation doctrine serves purposes
of foundational importance, as he so forcefully indicated in the
quotation that starts off this article. In the writing from which the
quotation came, Justice Scalia went on to argue that liberty is further
safeguarded when representatives are checked as they are in the73
Article I legislative process. Similarly, he wrote in his dissenting
opinion in Mistretta v. United States: "It is difficult to imagine a
principle more essential to democratic government than that upon
which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded: Except
in a few areas constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the
basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the
Legislature."
C. Delegation Is Not Justiciable
Despite his belief in the critical importance of the delegation
doctrine, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in American Trucking
concluded that the doctrine is in essence nonjusticiable: "we have
'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those
executing or applying the law."' 75 The internal quotation is from his
own dissenting opinion in Mistretta v. United States. Here it is in
context:
But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is
unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts. Once
it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise,
and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy
considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to
the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation
becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question
of degree. As Chief Justice Taft expressed the point for the Court
in the landmark case of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
72. See supra text accompanying note 38.
73. Scalia, supra note 1, at A24.
74. 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
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276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928), the limits of delegation "must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination." Since Congress is no less endowed
with common sense than we are, and better equipped to inform
itself of the "necessities" of government; and since the factors
bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the
nonpartisan sense) highly political .. .it is small wonder that we
have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law. As the Court points out,
we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to
invalidate a law only twice in our history, over half a century ago.
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A. I46A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
There are three elements in this argument: (1) there is no judicially
manageable test of delegation's constitutionality and (2) Congress
must, as a matter of necessity, leave some discretion to the executive
branch so that, as a consequence, (3) the Court has struck statutes on
delegation grounds only twice. The same elements are also found in
the majority opinion in Mistretta, which Justice Scalia also cites in
American Trucking.77 This argument is impressive in form, but puny
in substance. None of its three elements can withstand scrutiny.
1. Is There a Judicially Manageable Test of Unconstitutional
Delegation?
The Court's current test of unconstitutional delegation is elastic. To
satisfy the "intelligible principle" test, it is enough for Congress to
state the goals that should guide the agency in making the laws. The
Court's test thus rides on a question of degree-did Congress say
enough about its goals-but without providing any standard to gauge
when Congress has failed to say enough. This test thus does create
problems of manageability, as the Court found in Printz v. United
71
States.
Whether the "intelligible principle" test is worse than any other test
of constitutionality that the Court manages to enforce is another
question. Louis Jaffe, a supporter of delegation, thought not:
"[N]early every doctrine of constitutional limitation has been attacked
76. 488 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. 531 U.S. at 474-75.
78. 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) ("This Court has not been notably successful in ...
[implementing the intelligible principle test]; indeed, some think we have abandoned the
effort to do so.") (citing David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court
Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1233 (1985)).
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as vague. Essentially the charges go to the institution of judicial
review as we have it rather than specifically to the delegation
doctrine., 79 The "intelligible principle" test is no more elastic than
many other constitutional tests, such as the intermediate scrutiny tests
used in judging gender discrimination or regulations on the time,
place, and manner of speech. s Indeed, it is no more elastic than the
political question doctrine under which the Court finds that doctrines
are not justiciable if there is no judicially manageable standard.81 The
Court, of course, has not held that gender discrimination or
regulations of the time, place, and manner of speech are
nonjusticiable or, for that matter, that the political question doctrine
itself is not judicially manageable.
Justice Scalia, writing before he went on the bench, argued that the
supposed lack of a judicially manageable test should not keep the
Court from enforcing the delegation doctrine:
In fact, the argument may be made that in modem circumstances
the unconstitutional delegation doctrine, far from permitting an
increase in judicial power, actually reduces it. For now that judicial
review of agency action is virtually routine, it is the courts, rather
than the agencies, that can ultimately determine the content of
standardless legislation. In other words, to a large extent judicial
invocation of the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a self-
denying ordinance-forbidding the transfer ot2)egislative power
not to the agencies, but to the courts themselves.
79. Jaffe, supra note 67 at 577.
80. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
81. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597,
622 (1976) (calling the political question doctrine "deceptive").
82. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REGULATION 25, 28 (July/Aug.
1980). These words were written before the Court, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984), instructed lower courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutory
provisions with uncertain meanings. Courts at all levels have found ways to apply Chevron
in ways that allow plenty of scope to impose their own reading on statutes of uncertain
meaning. E.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996); Thomas Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969 (1992); Peter Schuck &
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984 (1990). Moreover, as the Court held in United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), Chevron deference will not be accorded only where Congress
has explicitly or implicitly indicated to the courts to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes. Mead's "background rule is that ambiguity in legislative instructions to agencies
is to be resolved not by the agencies but by the judges." 533 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Finally, in American Trucking, Justice Scalia stated that, when a statute is
sufficiently vague to raise delegation concerns, the job of construing it narrowly is for the
courts, not the agency. 531 U.S.at 473.
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Nonetheless, the elasticity of the "intelligible principle" test would
create political problems for the Court, as can be illustrated by the
facts of American Trucking. The Clean Air Act's supposedly
"intelligible principle", according to the EPA, is that it must set
ambient air quality standards pegged to protect health.83 Yet, the
pollutants at issue in the case pose some threat to health at vanishing
small levels84 and the EPA was not going to set the ambient air
quality standards at zero. Thus, the agency's "intelligible principle"
provided no criteria to decide how safe is safe enough. Yet, if the
Court had used the "intelligible principle" test to strike the statute, the
Court could offer no specific explanation of how specific is specific
enough. It would have been open to the charge that it was using the
delegation doctrine as a pretext for protecting business from
regulation needed to protect public health. The Court is particularly
vulnerable to this kind of attack when it invokes the delegation
doctrine because of its association with the Court's policy-motivated
opposition to the early New Deal.
The upshot is that the Court has applied its "intelligible principle"
test in a way that requires Congress to say nothing intelligible about
the hard choices that turn campaign slogans into rules of law.
Instead, Congress gets to make fuzzy promises and then pass fuzzy,
feel-good statutes.
While the "intelligible principle" test is troublesomely elastic, it is
not the only conceivable test of unconstitutional delegation. Quite
another test grew out of the text of the Constitution and was taken as a
premise in the early Supreme Court. The essence of this test was that
86
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power. That meant that if
Congress wanted to regulate interstate commerce, it would have to do
the regulating itself. What regulating meant was clearly understood.
As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden, to regulate
commerce is "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
,87governed." Similarly, he wrote in Fletcher v. Peck that "[i]t is the
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules ... would seem
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (b)(1) (1994).
84. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, v EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
85. American Trucking's recitation of the case law makes this abundantly clear. See
American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75.
86. See discussion of Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813) at text accompanying note 5.
87. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
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• ,,88
to be the duty of other departments." He also wrote in Wayman v.
Southard that it is the job of Congress to make the rules, but allowed
it may leave it to others "to fill up the details. 89 That means, in
essence, that Congress must itself state the rules, but that those rules
do not necessarily have to anticipate every question that may come
up. No set of rules can.
The upshot of Chief Justice Marshall's approach is that Congress
must tackle the controversial choices. 90 Now, under the Court's
current "intelligible principle" test, it is enough for Congress to
instruct an agency to pursue some set of goals-be they "guns" and
"butter" or "clean air" and "more jobs"-but leave to the a ency the
controversial choices as to the priorities among those goals.
Under this formulation, the executive still has a job to do to, and it
is not entirely ministerial. The executive must execute the laws, which
of course includes interpreting them.
The distinction between legislative powers and other powers upon
which Chief Justice Marshall's test of delegation was built is still very
much part of modem Supreme Court jurisprudence, except when it
comes to delegations of legislative power to agencies. In the Steel
Seizure case, the Court struck the President's seizure of the steel
92industry because it was a unilateral exercise of a legislative power.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black held that it fell on the legislative
side of the line because it was at bottom lawmaking, not law
execution.
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent
nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
execute. The first section of the first article says that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States ...... After granting many powers to the
Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
88. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
89. Wayman v. Southard 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
90. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 2 at 183-84.
91. See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1223, 1225-26 (1985).
92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
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this Constitution in the Govement of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."
The Court also distinguished legislative powers from other powers
in INS v. Chadha.94 In that case, the Court had to decide whether one
house of Congress could change the immigration rule applicable to
certain individuals or rather whether such an action would have to be95
undertaken through the full Article I legislative process. Because
one house or even a committee of one house necessarily must have
the power to take certain actions on its own, such as adjourn the house
or schedule hearings, the Court could not say that all decisions on
Capitol Hill must always be made through the Article I legislative
96
process. The Court decided, however, that the legislative veto did
violate Article I because the power being exercised was legislative
and thus vested in Congress through Article I and not one of the
powers that one house was expressly authorized to take on its own. In
his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote, "[e]xamination
of the action taken here by one House . . . reveals that it was
essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise
power defined in Art. I, §8, cl. 4, to 'establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,' the House took action that had the purpose and effect,, 97
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons ....
Thus, harking back to Chief Justice Marshall, Chief Justice Burger
held that the legislative veto at issue in Chadha was the exercise of a
legislative power because it changed a rule of private conduct.
The distinction between lawmaking and law execution is a major
improvement on the "intelligible principle" test. The rule-of-conduct
test rides on the qualitative question of whether Congress is doing the
work of a legislature, not the quantitative question of whether
Congress has said enough about the goals that lawmakers in an98
agency should pursue. The Court today applies a closely related test
in deciding whether Congress properly exercises its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." 99 Under that test, Congress
93. Id. at 587-88.
94. 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
95. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
96. The Constitution explicitly authorizes a single house of Congress to take such
actions as adopting its own rules of procedure. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
97. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
98. See Schoenbrod, supra note 91 at 1249-52.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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may use its Section 5 power for the purpose of enforcing the rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but may not use that
power for the purpose of changing those rights.I1°
Recent scholarship supports the contention that the Court's original
test is judicially manageable. An article by Gary Lawson, for
example, demonstrates that the various modern efforts to restate the
original test produce consistent results across a range of modern101
cases. An article by Michael Rappaport points out that early
understandings of legislative power are complemented by early
understandings of executive power. 
12
2. Is Delegation Necessary?
The claim that delegation is a necessity stems from the
misunderstanding that the delegation doctrine would require Congress
to make all the discretionary decisions in government. Under the
original understanding of legislative powers, however, Congress had
to make the rules of private conduct, not make the discretionary
choices involved in exercising executive and judicial powers, such as
enforcing and interpreting rules, managing public property3and funds
(once appropriated), and conducting foreign relations. Kenneth
Culp Davis suggests that this original understanding was never taken
seriously because, he charges, even the first Congress found that it
had to freely delegate legislative power. These charges are
erroneous. Professor Rappaport shows that they are based upon the
misunderstanding that the executive function was to have no
discretionary power.
The argument that delegation is a necessity of government today is
based upon the same error. Congress can delegate to the executive
discretion in enforcing and administering the laws it lays down. For
example, should Congress require, much as it did in the Clean Air
Act, that existing air pollution sources reduce emissions to at least the
average achieved "by the best performing 12 percent of the existing
100. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
101. See Lawson, supra note 40, at 378-95.
102. See Rappaport, supra note 40, at 303-09.
103. See Lawson, supra note 40, at 394; Rappaport, supra note 40, at 313;
SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 180-19 1.
104. See Rappaport, supra note 40, at 310 (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 47-48 (University of Illinois Press
1971) (1969).
105. See Rapapport, supra note 40, at 310.
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sources" in the same category, the administrator would have
discretion in determining how to categorize sources and interpret the
data on their emissions, but still Congress would have laid down the
rule of conduct.
At least some of the Justices believe that government could
function if Congress had to take responsibility for the laws that are
now made by the agencies. Writing in a law review while still an
appellate judge, Justice Breyer pointed out that the demise of the
legislative veto in Chadha posed no insuperable obstacle to Congress
reviewing agency regulations. It could, if it wished, enact legislation
that would keep new agency regulations from going into effect until
enacted through the Article I legislative process. Justice Breyer
anticipated the objection that Congress could not handle the workload
by pointing out that the legislation could provide for fast-track
treatment of agency regulations.
One might think that a power hungry Congress would leap to
implement Justice Breyer's idea. But it carries a hidden sting.
Legislators would become responsible for all of the laws. Unlike with
the legislative veto, legislators implementing Justice Breyer's
alternative could not confine their accountability to those rare
occasions when political capital is to be made by putting a regulation
to a vote. Thus, Justice Breyer's alternative would force them to make
all of the hard choices in lawmaking. That would be a significant
change from current practice and is not the way to guarantee
reelection.
Justice Breyer made it clear that even though his idea was an
intellectual possibility, he was not advocating it.1°8 It would be
surprising if he did because he has also revealed in other contexts that
he prefers the laws to be made by elite, expert civil servants rather
than elected lawmakers. 109 The implicit but unmistakable point in his
article on Chadha is that legislators could have power over agency
lawmaking if they had the stomach to take the responsibility that
comes with it. That they lack.
There are hints that other Justices believe that government could
106. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2000).
107. See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793-94
(1984).
108. See id. at 797-98.
109. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 55-63 (1993).
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work without delegation. Justice Scalia called for the Court to enforce
the delegation doctrine before he became a judge 1 Justice Thomas,
in his concurrence in American Trucking, seems to hope for a time
when the Court can enforce the delegation doctrine: "[o]n a future day
* I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation
jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of
separation of powers." ' l Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence
in the Benzene case, called for the Occupational Safety and Health
Act to be struck on delegation grounds. 1'2
Still other Justices, from their various perspectives, may well
sympathize with the Chief Justice or Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Especially likely to do so are Justices who believe that the national
government has gone too far in taking over matters that should
constitutionally be left to the states. The delegation doctrine, from this
perspective, would bolster the judicial and political safeguards off 13 , ,114 _ i
federalism. At the same time, "real federalism" would make it
easier for Congress to avoid delegation, perhaps even without a
scheme like Justice Breyer's. It is worth noting, however, that a
robust delegation doctrine does not in itself reduce the scope of
Congressional power, but rather requires Congress to take more direct
responsibility for its exercise.
3. Was The Delegation Doctrine Enforced In Only Two Cases?
The third element in the argument that delegation is nonjusticiable
is that the Court has managed to enforce it in only two cases, both
decided in 1935. In the writings of some Justices, the implication is
that these cases were not the product of any ordinary judicial
temperament, but rather the ill-considered splutterings of a politicized
Court antagonistic to the New Deal. 115 The implication is wrong
because those decisions drew support from across a broad ideological
spectrum. Justice Brandeis voted with the eight-to-one majority in
110. See Scalia,supra note 82.
111. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
112. Indus. Union Dep't v, Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
113. See Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to
Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001).
114. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD
HAPPEN 2 (1999).
115. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Panama RefiningI16 and Justices Cardozo and Brandeis were part of
the unanimous Court in Schechter.
117
In any event, the Court has seen fit to enforce the delegation
principle on many other occasions without formally invoking the
doctrine. For one example, in INS v. Chadha, the Court held, in effect,
that Congress may not delegate its legislative powers to one or two
houses of Congress." 8 The Court claimed that this was a case about
compliance with the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article
I, Section 7, and not about delegation,1 9 but that claim does not pass
the blush test. The reason that the Court gave for why the legislative
veto in Chadha violates Section 7 is that the legislative veto was the120
exercise of a legislative power. By that reasoning, the delegation of
legislative power to an agency violates Section 7, even if it does not
violate the delegation doctrine.
121
The majority in Chadha offered the additional rationale that a
legislative veto is different from delegation to an agency because the
latter is subject to judicial review for compliance with the terms of the
statute. 22 Yet, to the extent that the delegation to an agency is broad,
the statute places little if any constraint on it. This is a functionalist
distinction with little if any functional content.
There are additional examples of the Court stopping delegations of
legislative powers. In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court, having
concluded that the line item veto power was legislative, held that123 . " "
Congress could not delegate it to the President. While claiming to
be deciding the case under the Presentment Clause, the Court actually124
analyzed the case in delegation terms.
In earlier cases, the Court struck statutes that incorporated state law
into federal law and thus delegated national legislative power to state
legislatures. 125 In another early case dealing with a vague federal
116. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
117. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
118. 462 U.S. 919, 952, 959 (1983).
119. See id. at 954-55.
120. See id. at 952-55.
121. See id. at at 986-87 (White, J., dissenting); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 131-32 (3d ed. 2000).
122. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 n.10.
123. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
124. See id. at 439. For a more extended argument that Clinton v. City of New York is a
delegation case, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2366-67 (2001).
125. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C.
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criminal statute, the Court held that Congress may not delegate its
126
legislative power to prosecutors, judges, and juries This case-
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.-illustrates the essential
connection between delegation and the void-for vagueness-cases.
Finally, the Court has interpreted statutes delegating power to
agencies in order to avoid questions of constitutionality. The Court
cannot know when it is necessary to construe a statute to avoid
delegation problems unless it thinks it has a judicially manageable test
to know when a delegation problem exists.
There is one thing that the Court has not done to keep Congress
from delegating its legislative power-stopping it from delegating to
agencies acting under cloak of expertise. The exception to prove
the rule is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,129 where the Court held that it
was unconstitutional for Congress to empower the Civil Service
Commission to decide whether aliens could hold civil service jobs.
The Court, however, negated the suggestion that it was about to stop
delegation to administrative agencies by claiming that its decision
was based on "due process," not the delegation doctrine. 1 The
attempt to have it both ways was far-fetched, as the dissent showed.1
3t
There is an essential similarity between Clinton v. City of New York
and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. Both cases seemed like aberrations
from the Court's earlier decisions because they struck delegations to132
agencies or the President, as dissents in both cases pointed out.
What distinguishes these cases from the delegations that pass muster
is that the power delegated quite clearly required the exercise of
political, and not expert, judgment. These were the sorts of
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
126. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
127. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat'l
Cable Television Ass'n, v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
128. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989), in which the Court upheld a
delegation "to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of
formulating sentencing guidelines," comes within the Progressive rationale for delegation,
because the New Deal Progressives came to favor transferring power not only to expert
agencies but also to courts. Id. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000).
129. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
130. Id. at 116-17.
131. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) at 117, 122-24; see also Tribe, supra note 121, at
982-83 (discussing Hampton in the delegation context).
132. Clinton 524 U.S. at 483-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hampton, 426 U.S. at 123-24
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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delegations that even Progressives would have had no difficulty in
seeing as unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. Yet the
difference between such delegations and those that are routinely
upheld is only in appearance and not in content because agencies
make policy when they make the laws and are not in fact above
politics. 
133
III. Too BIG TO BE STRUCK
Although the reasons that the Court gives for refusing to enforce
the delegation doctrine make little sense, its refusal does make sense.
Were it to apply its original, judicially manageable test to delegations
across the board, the Court would strike as unconstitutional most of
the federal government's regulation of the private sector and the states
as it presently operates.
The enormous scale on which the Constitution is being violated and
the impact of those violations on core constitutional values is what
prompts some people, myself included, to have such grave concerns
about delegation. Ironically, however, the enormous scale of the
constitutional violation also makes it impossible for the Court to
strike it all of a sudden.
Consider the practical problem that the Court would face in
enforcing the delegation doctrine, a problem similar in scale to that
the Court faced when it first struck school segregation. The southern
state governments had structured themselves in reliance on a now-
discarded understanding of the Constitution. In the school
desegregation cases, however, the Court had a ready way to manage
the transition to constitutional compliance that would be unavailable
in delegation cases. The plaintiffs in the school desegregation cases
sought injunctions, and the Court instructed the lower courts to draft
them to allow time for the transition.134 In contrast, in delegation
cases, the relief sought is a declaration that the regulation issued by an
agency is unconstitutional. A court would sound silly saying that a
regulation is constitutional for now, but will be unconstitutional after
a while.
Justice Scalia, before becoming a judge, suggested that the
Supreme Court allow a gradual transition away from unconstitutional
declaration by announcing that it would enforce the delegation
133. See supra text accompanying note 20.
134. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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doctrine, but apply it only to statutes enacted after the
announcement. This method of gradually transiting away from
delegation was, however, subsequently foreclosed by the Court's
holding that, if once a newly announced constitutional test is given
retrospective effect in one case, it must be applied retrospectively in136
all cases. The rationale was that selective prospectivity makes it
look as if the Court was functioning as a political rather than a
judicial institution.
37
While a judicially created mechanism to manage a transition away
from unconstitutional delegation would likely make the Court appear
somewhat political, the Court would need to draw upon all of its
judicial grandeur to have any hope of weathering the political storm
that would follow a decision to stop delegation to federal agencies.
The Court would run into vehement opposition from Congress.
During hearings suggesting that Congress embrace its lawmaking
authority and eschew delegation, Democrats on the committee were
incredulous. 1
38
The Republicans also would bash the Court quicker than one can
say "Enron" for making a transition away from unconstitutional
delegation. Where the Republican leadership would line up is made
clear by recent legislative developments. When a buzz on delegation
began in the early 1990s and with a Democrat in the White House, a
Republican asked me to help craft legislation that would force
Congress to take responsibility for the laws. The result was a bill-the
Congressional Responsibility Act of 2001-modeled on Justice
Breyer's alternative to the legislative veto.139
For legislators, sponsoring this bill was politically productive. It
cast them as willing to take responsibility and in favor of giving their
constituents their due voice in lawmaking. It also gave them a handy
club with which to criticize as undemocratic regulations promulgated
by the administration of a President from the opposing party.
Many of these sponsors wanted to bring the bill to the floor. Yet the
135. See Scalia, supra note 82, at 27.
136. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991).
137. Id. at 541-44; Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. The Role of Congress in Monitoring Administrative Rulemaking: Hearing on H.R.
1036 and H.R. 1704 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41-42 (1997).
139. Congressional Responsibility Act of 2001, H.R. 105, 107th Cong. (2001). For a
discussion of Justice Breyer's alternative to the legislative veto, see supra text
accompanying note 107.
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Republican leadership took active steps to stop them. They made sure
that the bill went no further than several subcommittee hearings in the
House. Their reluctance to hold floor votes on the bill is
understandable. Republicans, no less than Democrats, use delegation
to avoid hard choices and to make it easier to pass legislation that
makes them look good back home. Besides, if the Republicans had
brought the Congressional Responsibility Act of 2001 to the floor, the
Democrats would have painted the bill as a Republican effort to strip
Americans of needed regulatory protection.
Against this background, it is likely that if Republican appointees
to the Court joined in a decision enforcing the delegation doctrine,
Republicans in Congress would deride the appointees so that they
would not themselves be derided by the Democrats in Congress.
Some people, no doubt, would side with the Court against
Congress. Many ordinary people still hold the traditional belief that
elected legislators should take responsibility for the laws. The cab
driver quoted at the beginning of this Article is one of them. Yet other
people, often highly educated ones, are of a different mind. They are
schooled to believe in regulation by experts. And it is natural that they
should take to this teaching: through it, they or people like them get to
participate in lawmaking without being elected as lawmakers. They
function as agency officials, lawyers, lobbyists, and experts in making
the laws at the agency level. Less-educated people are differently
situated. For them, delegation is an end-run on the one small piece of
political power they have-the vote. President Roosevelt perceived
something like this division of opinion when he rejected the
suggestion of his advisers to press for a pro-delegation constitutional
amendment partly out of fear that ordinary voters would be offended
by freeing the lawmakers they elect from responsibility for the laws.
As the President's press secretary put it, the President did not seek a
constitutional amendment approving delegation for fear that they
"might lose a number of '[their] congressmen.
' 140
Perhaps the dichotomy in public opinion that I am suggesting is
overdrawn, but the conclusion is the same-the Court probably could
not, in the current political climate, make stick a sudden decision to
stop delegation. The last time the Court attempted to do so, it ran into
the Court-packing plan and the humiliating "switch in time that saved
140. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 59 at 385-86 (quoting Raymond Clapper MS Diary,
Feb. 8, 1937, paraphrasing and quoting Roosevelt's press secretary Stephen Early).
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Nine." 41 Even if a majority on the Court could be mustered today,
surviving the political storm would be made more difficult by the
sixty years of intervening case law approving delegation and the
considerable transition required to return to a government without
delegation.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?-FEDERALISM CASE
LAW AS THE MODEL
For most of the twentieth century, delegation doctrine and
federalism doctrine moved in tandem. The Progressives called for
both empowering agencies and centralizing control in Washington of
what had been, up until then, local matters. The Court's efforts to
curb delegation and centralization prompted the Court-packing plan142
under whose pressure the Court bent. As of 1990, the Court seemed
altogether unlikely to place limits on delegation or centralization.
Congress could, it seemed, legislate on any topic, no matter how
local. Federalism, like the delegation doctrine, was seen as an
antiquated idea. Yet in the past decade, a five-Justice majority has
struck statutes for exceeding the powers of Congress or narrowly
construed them to avoid federalism-based constitutional issues. 43
While these decisions have produced some teethgnashing in the144 145
press and academia, as well as legislation to skirt the Court's
decisions, the Court has taken only baby steps. The decisions have
touched the powers of Congress only at the margins. United States v.
141. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (4th ed. 2001).
142. See PURCELL, supra note 128, at 33-38.
143. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Print v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001). I am referring here to these Article I cases and not to the parallel line of cases
decided under and discussing the Eleventh Amendment. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
144. See e.g., Timothy M. Phelps, Judicial Revolution; Recent Cases Reveal Slant
Towards States, NEWSDAY, May 29, 1995, at A13; Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal
Power: Close Vote on Term Limits Shows Extent of Court's Division Over "First
Principles," N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at Al.
145. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000);
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
146. Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000); Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
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Lopez, striking the Gun Free School Zones Act, limited the extent to
which Congress could use its commerce power to regulate non-
economic activity. As the Court pointed out, the legislators had
already gotten out of the act what they had wanted, the opportunity to
cast a symbolically popular vote that would, in fact, do nothing for
their constituents. Indeed, by giving Congress an occasion to
reenact the statute in slightly different form, Lopez gave the
legislators the opportunity to cast yet another self-congratulatory vote.
The decision itself left Congress free to regulate intrastate activity that
is colorably economic in nature and so did not jeopardize the great
bulk of statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In general,
the Court's recent Commerce Clause cases have "tinkered with
existing doctrine rather than challenging its foundations."
148
City of Boerne v. Flores, striking the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, and Morrison v. United States, striking the
Violence Against Women Act, held that statutes passed pursuant to
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be aimed at
implementing the rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, not
supplementing them. 147They left Congress free to regulate in ways
colorably necessary to enforce those rights. New York v. United150f15
States and Printz v. United States1 held that Congress may not
require state legislatures to legislate or state executive branch officials
to execute federal law. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers52 invoked federalism in interpreting narrowly a statute that
might have been interpreted narrowly anyway on purely statutory
grounds.
These decisions leave unaffected the great bulk of what Congress
does. 153 Justice Anthony Kennedy implied as much in his concurrence
in Lopez: "[T]he absence of structural mechanisms to require [the
political branches] to undertake this principled task [determining
whether they were acting within Congress's enumerated powers], and
147. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
148. Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 479
(2002).
149. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
150. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
151. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
152. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
153. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
643 (1996).
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the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their
failure to do so, argue against a complete renunciation of the judicial
role."
15 4
Although these cases symbolize federalism rather than realize it,
they are nonetheless important to those who place a high value on it.
They keep alive the claim that our national government is one of
limited powers. They also introduce the claim into current politics. 
55
In response to these decisions, Congress has held hearings on the
constitutionality of expansive national legislation whose validity had
previously been taken for granted. 116 Congress has also trimmed the
reach of at least one new statute to minimize its vulnerability to
constitutional challenge.157
In sum, the Court has begun a conversation with Congress on
federalism. It is hard to know where the conversation will go, but as
long as it continues, there is a prospect that federalism-based limits on
the power of Congress will return in increments or in vastly different
times.
As with federalism, the Court has also taken baby steps in the
delegation context. It has kept alive the idea that Congress should not
delegate its legislative powers not only by saying so in cases such as
Loving and Clinton v. City of New York, but also by giving the idea
operational meaning in some of the cases discussed in the previous
section. These decisions are all baby steps because they are all framed
in terms that do not commit the Court to stopping Congress from
delegating to agencies.
154. 514 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
155. For a more elaborated explanation of essentially the same understanding of the
federalism cases, see MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT
COULD HAPPEN 79-150 (1999).
156. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999);
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on
H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (1998). See also States Rights and Federal Remedies: When Are Employment
Laws Constitutional?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001); Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).
157. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-
274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) is far narrower than the bill originally introduced-Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
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V. WHY No BABY STEP IN AMERICAN TRUCKING?
In American Trucking, a giant step was never possible, but a baby
step was. The giant step would have been to hold that the statute
unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. American Trucking
was the worst possible case for such a holding. The provision at issue
ordered the EPA administrator to promulgate ambient air standards
sufficient to protect health with an adequate margin of safety. The
principle to guide the agency here is seemingly more intelligible than
most statutory provisions authorizing agencies to make regulatory
rules. If the Clean Air Act were to fall, so too would most delegations.
Moreover, there is strong public support for the Clean Air Act and its
principle that human health must be protected from pollution. A
decision striking the Clean Air Act would set up the Supreme Court to
be attacked as an enemy of public health and safety.
The plausible baby step in American Trucking was to interpret the
statute to make the principle in the statute more intelligible and so to
reduce the scope of the delegated power. The seemingly clear
statutory principle guiding the EPA in setting ambient air quality
standards formulation intentionally evaded a tough choice. For most
pollutants, there is no threshold above which air pollution is
unhealthy and below which it is safe. As pollutant levels are reduced
towards zero, there still is some diminishingly small threat to health.
The legislative history and reality made clear that EPA was not to set
the ambient standards at zero. So EPA would necessarily have to
leave some threat to health. The statute evaded the question of how
much.
The evasion was intentional. As the author of the Clean Air Act,
Senator Edmund Muskie, later admitted, "[o]ur public health
scientists and doctors have told us that there is no threshold, that any
air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act is based on the
assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there
is a threshold. When we set the standards, we understood that below
the standards that we set there would still be health effects.' ' 158
Congress is no more anxious to wrestle with the question of how
safe is safe enough now than in the 1970s. There was much criticism
of the American Trucking regulations by Democrats and Republicans
158. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl.
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 95th Cong. 8 (1977).
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alike,15 9 and there was a legislative process in place that would have
allowed an expedited vote on the regulations. 16  Although the
regulations are more important than most of what fills the days of
legislators, Congress took a pass on a momentous policy decision that
an appointed agency head had made without meaningful standards.
61
The question of how safe is safe enough was thus delegated to the
administrative process. One conceivable way of answering the
question was taken off the table when, in the 1970s, the EPA, with the
approval of the D.C. Circuit, interpreted the Clean Air Act to bar it
from considering costs in setting ambient air standards. 162 As the
attorney for the environmental side in that case, I had pressed the
EPA to adopt that interpretation even though I knew that the EPA
would necessarily consider the costs of the ambient standard and their
political repercussions. I thought that I would get a stronger ambient
standard for my clients if the EPA did not have to explain how it
balanced costs concerns against health concerns. Today, it is widely
understood that the agency does consider costs while maintaining an
163
official posture of not doing so. This way, the agency need not
justify how it takes costs into account and so has maximum flexibility
to bend with the changing political winds.
When it came to setting the ambient air standards at issue in
American Trucking, the EPA also denied that it must show that the
health risks it was acting to stop are significant. 164 To show that the
159. See e.g., Agency Chief Answers Bipartisan Attacks on Air Proposals, Says No
Decision Made, 28 ENV'T REP. 150, 150 (1997); Moderates in Senate Seek United Position
on Proposals to Tighten Ozone, PM Rules, 28 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 262, 262 (1997).
160. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000).
161. For a discussion of the standard and why it is vague, see supra text accompanying
notes 83-84.
162. Lead Indus. Ass'n, v. E.P.A., 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
163. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV.
303 (1999).
164. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,688 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,883 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§50). During the above rulemakings, the EPA Administrator asserted that Congress and
the courts gave her the right to render decisions that do not use quantification "or any other
metric" to determine "what risk is 'acceptable."' Id.at 38688 These decisions are thus
based on "no generalized paradigm" and are therefore "largely judgmental in nature." Id at
38883; See also Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc., The Aluminum Ass'n,
and the Steel Manufacturers Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 n.4,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
(No. 99-1257) (citing EPA Brief at 43, Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. E.P.A, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1441), where, in the Court of Appeals, the EPA Administrator
continued to insist that "nothing in the statute requires [her] to make any specific
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risks are significant would have been inconvenient for the agency. It
would have had to define what it meant by a "significant" threat to
health and it would have been obligated to set all its health standards
in keeping with that definition. As with the cost issue, the advantage
for the agency lay in maintaining the flexibility to bend with the
changing political winds.
The Supreme Court had faced a case like American Trucking
before. In Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration had set an
occupational health standard for benzene in the workplace without
regard to the significance of the risk. 65 The regulation was set at a
level at which it would eliminate insignificant health risks at great
expense. Noting that Congress had ducked the issue of how safe was
safe enough, Justice Stevens, writing for a four Justice plurality,
interpreted the statute to require the agency to regulate against
significant risks only. 166 Otherwise, he arfued, the statute might be
invalid under the delegation doctrine. 6  A fifth Justice, Justice
Rehnquist, would have struck the statute on delegation grounds.
68
The result in American Petroleum Institute is consistent with the
Progressives' idea of delegation. In their era, public health
professionals routinely made decisions about the significance of
health risks. The Progressives would have had no difficulty
conceiving of such decisions as a job of execution that a legislature
could properly leave to an expert agency. Although there is obviously
some discretion to decide which health threats are significant, there is
nothing like the discretion left to an EPA Administrator who can
regulate in the name of health without regard to whether the risks to
be guarded against are significant. The American Petroleum Institute
decision has, in fact, put OSHA regulations on a more disciplined
footing, with the result that business is less subject to the varying
whims of the agency, and also with the result that OSHA repulations
are upheld in court far more regularly than those of the EPA.17
9
The Supreme Court thus seemingly had a ready way to take a baby
'findings' or to structure her decisionmaking in any particular way.").
165. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,623 (1980).
166. Id. at 639-40.
167. Id. at 646.
168. Id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
169. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AT THE BENCH: THE
EPA'S RECORD IN FEDERAL COURT, (2000), available at http://www.rppi.org/
environment/ps269.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
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step in American Trucking to do what it had done in American
Petroleum Institute. This is what Professor Hamilton and I suggested
in our amicus brief. 1
70
The Solicitor General, however, sought to co-opt the significance
issue by taking the position that the statute actually confines EPA to. . . 171
regulating against risks that are significant. He did so most directly
at oral argument. The first question from the bench was "Did those
effects have to be medically significant," and he answered
affirmatively in the strongest possible terms. In upholding the
Clean Air Act against the delegation challenge, the Court relied on his
oral representations about the interpretation of the Act and compared
the Act as so interpreted to the outcome in American Petroleum
Institute. In the end, "significance" had been read into the statute
without invoking the delegation doctrine.
There was a counter to the Solicitor General's tactic to avoid the
delegation issue. It could have been pointed out to the Court that the
agency had promulgated the regulations and defended them in the
Court of Appeals under one reading of the statute (that the agency
does not have to show that the threat to health is significant), but now
was defending them under another reading of the statute (that the
agency does have to show that the threat to health is significant).
Rising to speak to argue after the Solicitor General, the advocate for
the industry side, Edward Warren, did not point out that the agency'74
had changed its interpretation of the statute. He understood the
significance issue and its connection to delegation because he won the
victory in American Petroleum Institute. He instead devoted his
attention to another goal-getting the Supreme Court to hold that the
Clean Air Act requires EPA to consider costs in setting ambient air
quality standards.
Having lost the cost issue before the D.C. Circuit a quarter century
170. Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc., The Aluminum Ass'n, and the
Steel Manufacturers Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257).
171. His brief stated, "the health effects justifying a NAAQS must be 'adverse' in the
sense that they are medically significant and not merely detectable." Brief for the
Petitioners at 24, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257)
(internal citation omitted).
172. Oral Argument of Petitioner at 4, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (No. 99-1257).
173. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464 (2001).
174. Oral Argument of Respondents at 20-36, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257).
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before, industry could get EPA to consider its costs only with the help
of Congress or the Supreme Court. The cost issue had been industry's
primary environmental goal in Congress throughout the mid-1990s.
Despite devoting considerable resources to getting legislation
requiring EPA to consider costs, industry had fallen well short of its
goal. Now, Mr. Warren stood before the Supreme Court telling it that
the way to reduce the scope of the delegation to EPA was to require it
to consider costs.
Mr. Warren was arguing at a considerable disadvantage. Industry
tends to sound cynical in calling for costs to be considered in
environmental regulation because it comes across as seeking to
sacrifice other people's lives to increase its own profits. That was part
of the reason industry had lost in Congress. It was an even more
uphill battle in the Supreme Court because the D.C. Circuit had
repeatedly rejected industry's position, and Congress had left its
interpretation untouched when it subsequently reenacted the statute in
1990. 175 Yet, for industry, getting its costs to be weighed in the
balance was the brass ring, and Mr. Warren and his clients went for it.
Justice Stevens reacted to Mr. Warren's argument with a quip
whose tenor was altogether predictable: "Are you saying ...that
although the terms, 'requisite to ... protect the public's health' are
too vague and too standardless, it would be all right if [the statute]
said, 'are requisite to protect the public health provided it doesn't cost,,176 •. , ...
too much?"' Justice Scalia's opinion unanimously rejected the
argument that EPA can consider costs in setting ambient standards.
177
Yet other aspects of the opinion interpreted the Act to give industry
advantages in how the standards are implemented. One passage
seemed to require EPA to consider costs in implementing the ambient
air quality standards.178 Another passage approved a holding of the
D.C. Circuit that placed roadblocks in the way of implementing the
standard for ozone. 179 The delegation doctrine did poorly in American
Trucking, but Mr. Warren's clients fared quite well.
They might well have done better if he had pressed the significance
issue in the Supreme Court. Industry petitioners did take it up in the
175. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 10 1-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (amended 1990).
176. Oral Argument of Respondent, at 35-36, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257) (internal quotations marks supplied).
177. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468-7 1.
178. Id. at 467.
179. Id. at 476-86.
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post-American Trucking remand to the D.C. Circuit, pointing out that
EPA had promulgated the standards on the basis that it had limited
itself to protecting against threats to health that are significant. At this
stage, however, the issue was a loser. The once-reversed Court of
Appeals panel upheld the standards by accepting EPA's argument that• 180
it could not be expected to quantify degrees of risk. EPA could not
have made any such argument when arguing to the Supreme Court
that the scope of its discretion was narrowed by the requirement that it
regulate against only those risks that are significant.
Business has never been a reliable friend of the delegation doctrine.
Large national corporations were part of the drive towards delegation
in the early 1900s. They pressed for transferring key regulatory issues
from state legislatures to federal administrative agencies. They
were strong proponents of the National Industrial Recovery Act that
the Court struck in the two delegation decisions of 1935.182 They also
urged Congress in the mid-1960s to sfiift environmental regulation
from the state level to a federal agency that they hoped would be
ineffectual.
183
VI. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THE
POLITICS OF DELEGATION CASE LAW
There are benefits from understanding that, for at least some
Justices, the delegation case law is driven by the fear of the ire of
Congress should it be kept from passing the buck to agencies.
Such an understanding suggests a way of explaining the diverse
lines of cases that get discussed under the heading of "delegation."
The Court made an exception to the principle that the elected
legislators should make the law based upon the Progressives' notion
that delegation of technical questions to officials acting on the basis
of expertise was not delegation. Thus, while upholding delegations to
expert agencies, the Court of the early twentieth century refused to
uphold delegations to state legislatures or the criminal justice system
as in the early void-for-vagueness case of United States v. L. Cohen
180. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, v. E.P.A., 283 F.3d 355, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("EPA has no
obligation either to identify an accurate 'safe level' of a pollutant or to quantify precisely
the pollutant's risks prior to setting primary NAAQS.").
181. See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
182. SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 38-39.
183. Id. at 59.
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Grocery Co.184 The nearly unanimous decision in Panama Refining
and the unanimous decision in Schechter Poultry dealt with a
delegation that did not fit the Progressive model of experts resolving
technical issues because, in these cases, it was clear that the rules that
the President was signing into law had their origins in private deals
made in industry committees.
More recently, the pattern remains the same. While finding itself
unable to repeal the exception made for delegations that fit the
Progressive rationale, the Court refuses to broaden it. The Court
struck delegations to political actors acting on political questions in
cases such as Chadha (one or two houses of Congress taking
legislative action)185 and Clinton v. City of New York (the PresidentS 186
vetoing budget items). The Court struck the delegation to an agency
of matter that plainly lay outside its area of expertise in Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong. 8' The Court has also sometimes limited delegation
to expert agencies without declaring open war on such delegations b
narrowly constructing the agency's statutory powers 
in many cases.
The Court's real rule of decision is that delegations are permitted if
and only if they fit the Progressive model. This rule of decision is
without substance because it is all about the appearance rather than
the reality of what happens in the very political agency rulemaking
process. The Court's rule of decision is thus vacuous, but ironically
its official reasoning for refusing is to police delegation is that it lacks
a judicially manageable test.
For the longer term, this understanding of the case law
suggests that the Court might someday police delegations to agencies.
As the Court writes, the delegation doctrine is permanently
nonjusticiable. Yet, should there be a change in the present political
climate that makes it impossible for the Court to police delegations of
seemingly technical matters to agencies, the Court could change with
it. As the Court has acknowledged, "[i]n constitutional adjudication as
elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each
decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's
184. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
185. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
186. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
187. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
188. See supra note 34.
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constitutional duty."'
89
The circumstances that supported the decisions of the early
twentieth century in support of delegation have changed in part. We
no longer hold the Progressives' belief in the objectivity of experts or
the New Dealer's belief that agency regulations are perfectly
democratic because Congress can repeal them. What has not changed
is the power of the interests that benefit from delegation-the elected
legislators in Congress, all those in government whose income and
professional standing come from agency lawmaking, and the major
corporations, national advocacy organizations, and other private
interests that participate with agency lawmaking. Such arrangements
have sunk their roots into the American political landscape and will190
be tough to dig out.
Strange things do, however, happen in politics. Budget deficits
once seemed like a permanent and politically unassailable feature of
government, but then for a while seemed excusable only in times of
emergency. "Unfunded mandates" were once thought an
unquestionable tactic, but this too changed after that phrase came into. 191
common parlance. The drive against budget deficits and unfunded
mandates, whatever their merits and despite their less-than-full-
success, are examples of another deep-seated feature of the American
political landscape-a popular sense that government officials have
found ways to elude accountability to the electorate and should be
reined in. This popular sense has found expression in many other
ways, including the Republican "Contract With America," with its
99192
claim to "restore accountability to Congress, and the movements
to place term limits on legislators, to prevent legislators from giving
themselves salary increases that go into effect before they are
reelected,' and to reform campaign finance. There is reason to doubt
whether any of these movements will actually make government more
accountable, or, in any event, sate the popular appetite to make it
189. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
190. See generally, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
191. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (1995).
192. Contract With America (1994), available at http://www.house.gov/house/
Contract/CONTRACT.html.
193. See Congress Rejects Pay Raise: Public Outrage Overwhelms Lawmakers, 49
FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Feb. 10, 1989, at 87. In 1992, the last state ratified
the long-pending Twenty Seventh Amendment barring congressional pay increases from
taking effect until after the next election.
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so. The hunger to make government accountable may someday fix
on delegation, which in my opinion is a more deserving and
potentially fruitful target. Should that happen, the politics that deter
the Court from policing delegation to agencies would have changed.
It is, of course, not the Court's place to make the political case
against delegation. On the other hand, the Court does have a role to
play in explaining the Constitution to Congress and the people.
Unfortunately, however, the Court has at times explained the
Constitution in ways that effectively amount to colluding with
legislators in escaping their responsibility for the laws. Those older
cases holding that delegation is constitutional because it does not
undermine democratic accountability legitimated violations of the
Constitution by Congress. The modern cases that say that the Court
cannot police delegation because there is no test to distinguish
constitutional lawmaking from unconstitutional delegation do so too.
If the Justices cannot tell the constitutional from the unconstitutional,
neither can the legislators-so they are off the hook.
The Court has, however, begun to find ways to discharge its role of
explaining the Constitution. It now states that the Constitution forbids
delegation of legislative power and did so over the objection of
Justice Stevens, who preferred the formulation that some degree of• . . 195
delegation is permissible. The Court also states that the delegation
doctrine serves important constitutional purposes. There is one more
thing that the Court should do: refrain from repeating the error that
there is no judicially manageable test of unconstitutional delegation.
American Trucking did not literally repeat the error.
American Trucking comes close to being the best that the Court can
do for now when it comes to ruling on the constitutionality of
delegating seemingly technical issues to seemingly expert agencies:
uphold them on the basis of precedent rather than reference to the
constitutional text or constitutional values. Such an approach makes
the permissive approach to delegation brittle and therefore subject to
chipping and even breaking should new political pressures come to
194. See Thad Kousser & Ray LaRaja, The Effect of Campaign Finance Laws on
Electoral Competition: Evidence from the States, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 426 (Cato
Institute, Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-426es.html
(arguing that campaign finance reform renders incumbent legislators even more remote
from democratic accountability by making it more difficult for challengers to overcome
the advantages that incumbents have in running for reelection).
195. Compare Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 with id. at 489-90
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
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bear. Such an approach also makes it easier to take more baby steps in
support of the principle that the elected legislators should make the
law. It can do so in cases in which it narrowly construes statutes to
avoid delegation problems and in cases in which it prevents the
practice of delegation from spreading. Such cases provide opportunity
to further explain why the Article I lawmaking process is critical to
democratic accountability and liberty.
Were it to become clear that there is a discernible constitutional
standard which Congress must obey-that, in other words, the
96
delegation doctrine is an underenforced constitutional norm -
pressure could be placed upon Congress to put in place mechanisms
to live up to its responsibilities. Congress has adopted a number of
structural statutes designed to help it overcome the political pressures
that individual legislators feel to run excessive budget deficits and
impose unsuitable unfunded mandates. 197 Similar structural measures
are needed to help Congress overcome the political pressures that
individual legislators feel to evade their constitutional responsibilities.
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule have proposed structural
legislation that would force the Houses of Congress to take seriously
the question of whether the legislation it enacts conforms to the
Constitution.18 The House and the Senate have offices of legal
counsel, but they are not charged with advising whether pending
legislation is constitutional. Their job is to protect the legislators
rather than to protect the Constitution. This should change.
Finally, a clearer understanding of the principle that elected
lawmakers should take responsibility for the laws is also important
from a global perspective. Many countries want to emulate the public
law of the United States because it is rightly seen as contributing to199
our political freedom, economic prosperity, and civil liberty. The
dominant feature that makes our public law work is that governmental
elites are accountable to the people. Delegation, however, is a failure
amid the success. It detracts from that democratic accountability. It
196. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
197. See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat 1388-573
(1990); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501-1571 (1995).
198. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian
Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001).
199. See Steven G. Calabresi, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 22, 22 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
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reflects a failure by the Supreme Court in holding the politicians to
ground rules of government that keep them accountable. It is a failure
that need not have happened if the Court had not wandered from its
assigned path during the early decades of the twentieth century. If the
Court's failure is understood for what it is, other countries are less
likely to emulate our mistake.
VII. CONCLUSION
The principle that the elected legislators should make the laws has
most of the essential elements of a vibrant constitutional doctrine: a
long pedigree rooted in the text and purposes of the Constitution, a
strong appeal to popular ideas of what is just and right, and a test of
ancient lineage that the Court could apply with consistency. What the
doctrine is lacking, at least for now, is political viability. That,
however, is no reason for the Court to bury the doctrine. Congress and
the President also have responsibilities to uphold the Constitution.
With them, the Court should continue the conversation that the
Justices began with Loving and Clinton v. City of New York. The
Court was not much of a conversationalist in American Trucking, but
the legislators, in their continuing flight from responsibility will, no
doubt, provide the Justices with fresh topics of conversation.
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